



**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
LUFKIN DIVISION**

**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

**§**

**VS.**

**§**

**CASE NO. 9:11-CR-33(9)**

**TIFFANY LORELLE STOVALL**

**§**

**FINDINGS OF FACT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLEA OF TRUE  
BEFORE THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and the Local Rules for the District Court, Eastern District of Texas, the District Court referred this matter for hearing and the submission of findings of fact and a report and recommendation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3401(i) and 3583(e). The United States alleges that the defendant, Tiffany Stovall, violated conditions of supervised release imposed by Chief United States District Judge Ron Clark. The United States Probation Office filed its *Petition for Warrant or Summons for Offender Under Supervision* (doc. #466) requesting the revocation of the defendant's supervised release. The Court conducted a hearing on August 26, 2015, in accordance with Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11, 32 and 32.1. The defendant was present and represented by counsel at the hearing. Having heard the evidence, this court factually finds that the defendant has violated conditions of supervision and recommends that such violation warrants the revocation of her supervised release.

After conducting the proceeding in the form and manner prescribed by Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 11, the Court finds:

- a. That the defendant, after consultation with counsel of record, has knowingly, freely and voluntarily consented to the administration of the plea of true in this cause by a United States Magistrate Judge subject to a final approval and imposition of sentence by the District Court.
- b. That the defendant is fully competent and capable of entering an informed plea, that the defendant is aware of the nature of the charges and the consequences of the plea, that her plea of true is a knowing and voluntary plea, not the result of force or threats, and that the plea is supported by an independent evidentiary basis in fact establishing each of the essential elements of the conduct.

#### **STATEMENT OF REASONS**

##### **A. Procedural History**

On May 22, 2012, The Honorable Ron Clark, U.S. District Judge of the Eastern District of Texas, sentenced Stovall after she pled guilty to the offense of possession of a listed chemical, a Class C felony. Judge Clark sentenced to the defendant to 57 months followed by 2 years supervised release subject to the standard conditions of release, plus special conditions to include substance abuse testing and treatment. On September 12, 2014, Tiffany Lorelle Stovall completed her period of imprisonment and began service of the supervision term. On May 29, 2015, the Court modified Ms. Stovall's conditions to include home detention and electronic monitoring for a period of 120 days. *See Order* (doc. #461).

##### **B. Allegations in Petition**

The United States Probation Office alleges that the defendant violated the following special condition of release:

*The defendant shall participate in a program of testing and treatment for substance abuse, under the guidance and direction of the U.S. Probation Office, until such time as the defendant is released from the program by the probation officer.*

**C. Evidence presented at Hearing:**

At the hearing, the Government proffered evidence in support of the allegation in the petition to revoke. Specifically, if the case proceeded to a final hearing, the Government would present evidence and testimony from officers with the United States Probation Office showing that on July 19, 2015, Ms. Stovall failed to call the random drug testing program phone line to receive reporting instructions to report for a random drug test on July 20, 2015. United States Probation Officer Gilbert Luna would testify that the agency designated to administer the random drug testing line contacted him to state that Ms. Stovall failed to call in as directed on July 19, 2015. Ms. Stovall also failed to provide a urine specimen as required on July 20, 2015.

Defendant, Tiffany Stovall, offered a plea of true to the allegations. Specifically, she agreed with the evidence summarized above and pled true to the allegation that she failed to comply with drug testing requirements in violation of her supervision conditions.

**D. Sentencing Guidelines; Findings and Recommended Disposition**

The allegations, supporting evidence and plea of true warrant revocation of supervised release. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The Court factually finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a special condition of her supervised release by failing to comply with drug testing requirements as directed. This conduct constitutes a Grade C violation under U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(a)(1). Upon finding a Grade C violation, the Court may revoke the defendant's supervised release. *See* U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(a)(2).

Based upon the Defendant's criminal history category of II and the Grade C violation, the sentencing guidelines suggest a sentence of imprisonment for a period ranging from 5 to 11 months. *See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a).* Because the original offense of conviction was a Class C felony, the statutory maximum imprisonment term upon revocation is two (2) years. *See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).*

According to U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(d), any restitution, fine, community confinement, home detention, or intermittent confinement previously imposed in connection with a sentence for which revocation is ordered that remains unpaid or unserved at the time of revocation shall be ordered to be paid or served in addition to the sanction determined under U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4, and any such unserved period of community confinement, home detention, or intermittent confinement may be converted to an equivalent period of imprisonment. In this case, according to the records submitted by the Probation Office, Ms. Stovall failed to serve 50 days of court-ordered home detention time.

If the Court revokes a defendant's term of supervision and orders the defendant to serve a term of imprisonment for that revocation, the Court may also require that the defendant be placed on a new term of supervised release. *See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h).* The length of this term of supervised release shall not exceed the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense which resulted in the original term of supervised release, less any term of imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of supervised release. *Id.* In this case, the authorized term of supervised release by statute is not more than 3 years. *See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2)&(h).*

The Fifth Circuit states that Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines regarding the revocation of supervised release is advisory only. *See United States v. Cade*, 279 F.3d 265, 271 n.2 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002) (citing *United States v. Montez*, 952 F.2d 854, 859 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1992); *United States v. Headrick*,

963 F.2d 777, 782 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1992)). Because Chapter 7 was promulgated as an advisory policy statement and there are no applicable guidelines for sentencing after revocation of supervised release<sup>1</sup>, the Court may impose a greater or lesser sentence upon revocation. *United States v. Gonzalez*, 250 F.3d 923, 925 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001). Further, a sentence imposed for revocation will be upheld unless it is in violation of the law or plainly unreasonable. *Id.* See also *United States v. Pena*, 125 F.3d 285, 288 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).

Here, the evidence and the defendant's own admission supports a finding that the defendant committed a Grade C violation of her supervision conditions. Ms. Stovall pled true, agreed with the Court's recommended sentence for that violation, and waived her right to allocute before the District Court.

Accordingly, based upon the defendant's plea of true, the agreement of the parties, and the evidence presented in this case, it is the recommendation of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge that the District Court accept the plea of true and revoke Defendant's supervised release. The undersigned magistrate judge recommends that the District Court order Defendant to serve a term of **five (5) months plus fifty (50) days** imprisonment. The additional 50 day period is imposed for failure to complete the court-ordered home detention period as part of her supervision conditions, as discussed above. The Court recommends that Ms. Stovall be placed in the **Federal Prison Camp in Bryan, Texas**, if possible, while in BOP custody as requested on the record at the revocation hearing.

The Court further recommends that, upon release from prison, the defendant serve a new

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
<sup>1</sup> See *U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual*, Ch. 7, pt. A, cmt. 1 ("At this time, the Commission has chosen to promulgate policy statements only.")

term of **supervised release of eleven (11) months**. The new term of supervision should be subject to the mandatory and standard conditions adopted by the Court and imposed in the original judgment of conviction. The Court further finds that the special conditions stated in the judgment originally imposed by the District Court are still relevant based on the record of the case and the evidence submitted by the Probation Office in conjunction with the petition to revoke.

### **OBJECTIONS**

Objections must be: (1) specific, (2) in writing, and (3) served and filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report. *See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)*. A party's failure to object bars that party from: (1) entitlement to *de novo* review by a district judge of proposed findings and recommendations, and (2) appellate review, except on grounds of plain error of unobjected-to factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court. *See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n*, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (en banc). The constitutional safeguards afforded by Congress and the courts require that, when a party takes advantage of his right to object to a magistrate's findings or recommendation, a district judge must exercise its nondelegable authority by considering the actual evidence and not merely by reviewing and blindly adopting the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. *See Hernandez v. Estelle*, 711 F.2d 619, 620 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1983); *United States v. Elsoffer*, 644 F.2d 357, 359 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1981) (per curiam).

**SIGNED this the 27th day of August, 2015.**



KEITH F. GIBLIN  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE